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Sudan confirmed on Tuesday that it will review last year’s naval base agreement with Russia following speculation in April that the deal might be shelved. According to Chief of General Staff Muhammad Othman al-Hussein, who made the announcement while speaking to the Blue Nile TV channel, this is supposedly because “some of the document’s provisions entail certain harm for Sudan.” He also reminded everyone that the deal had not yet been approved by the country’s legislature, so it was never legally binding to begin with. Moreover, the military official denied that Sudan’s decision has anything to do with American pressure.
It is unclear whether the latter claim is credible, since the U.S. has greatly expanded its influence in Sudan upon its recent removal of the country from the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. That move took place in the aftermath of the coup against the former President Omar al-Bashir, who had previously been regarded as close to Russia but ended up entering into a rapprochement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the years before his military-backed ouster. That policy reorientation resulted in him dispatching troops to assist the GCC’s war in Yemen and is thought to have served as a means for gradually repairing relations with the U.S., too.
In any case, the uncertainty surrounding Russia’s planned Sudanese naval base could harm Moscow’s regional interests. I explained the grand strategic contours of this move with respect to Russia’s broader engagement with the international Muslim community (Ummah) as well as discussed its economic significance considering the planned base’s location in Port Sudan, the terminal point of a prospectively promising Chinese Silk Road project stretching across the Sahel.
If these plans are scuttled, whether due to American pressure or Sudan’s own prerogative, then Russia should consider a regional replacement as soon as possible. One such scenario could be to explore the pros and cons of constructing a similar facility in the breakaway Somali region of Somaliland. Unconfirmed reports circulated in early 2018 speculating that Russia planned to establish such a base in the Djibouti-bordering town of Zeila. Although it never transpired, I nonetheless analyzed what it would have meant in a piece published at the time.
In the contemporary context, such a decision would admittedly be somewhat risky for Russia’s soft power, since Moscow would essentially be extending de facto support for the separatist region’s claims of sovereignty. This observation could clash with Russia’s principled support of international law, which recognizes Somaliland as an integral part of the Federal Republic of Somalia as well as sow the seeds of distrust between Moscow and Mogadishu. At the same time, though, it should not be forgotten that the UAE used to have a military base in Somaliland’s Berbera that was recently converted to a civilian facility.
The UAE previously relied on this base to assist its war in Yemen, but as Oxford scholar Dr. Samuel Ramani noted in his article for Al Monitor, “the UAE is reorienting its Red Sea strategy away from direct military intervention and toward a synthesis of economic investment and remote power projection.” In other words, the Emirates’ regional military engagement successfully enabled the country’s policy to evolve in the economic direction after opening up the requisite doors for this to happen with Somaliland’s leadership.
Russia could in principle follow in the UAE’s footsteps, though importantly without using its proposed base there for any active military purposes like Abu Dhabi did with Yemen. Even better yet, Russia should seriously consider clinching a comprehensive regional partnership with the UAE to enhance its position over the entire Horn of Africa. I argued such a proposal would be the next natural step in their emerging partnership of the past few years which has seen them coordinate more closely in Syria as well as expand military cooperation.
These developments confirm the increasingly independent nature of the UAE’s foreign policy seeing as how they contrast with its American ally’s efforts to contain Russia at every turn. This speaks to the sincere confluence of interests between those two countries that is driving their new era of relations. It is also worth mentioning that the UAE is a major player in Ethiopia, which is Africa’s second most populous state whose capital hosts the African Union. The Emirates’ plans to construct a connectivity corridor between Ethiopia and Somaliland terminating in Berbera could also in theory be utilized by Russia to expand trade with Ethiopia.
After all, Ethiopia experienced some of the world’s fastest economic growth prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic so it is worthwhile for Russia to consider expanding relations with this landlocked state via transit entities, such as Somaliland, and its UAE-constructed connectivity corridor. Even if Sudan agrees to respect its non-binding deal to host a Russian Red Sea base, that country might no longer serve as Moscow’s gateway to Ethiopia as previously expected after the re-eruption of last year’s border conflict in the midst of Addis Ababa’s ongoing military intervention in Tigray Province, hence the importance of actively searching for alternatives.
Djibouti might have been the one that first comes to the minds of Russian decision-makers, but it already hosts quite a few foreign military facilities so the situation there is very crowded, to begin with. Moscow might not feel comfortable being “one among many”, instead preferring to have privileged military access to one or another regional player so as to serve as a springboard for comprehensively expanding its relations with its host, ergo the strategic interest in doing so with Somaliland. Eritrea also remains an option, but it lacks reliable economic connectivity with Ethiopia, especially considering the ongoing military conflict in the neighboring Tigray Province.
It is for these reasons why Somaliland is arguably the best alternative to Russia’s troubled Sudanese naval base plans if the latter are ultimately scuttled. That said, the drawbacks of this policy could be that Somalia becomes offended by what it could claim is Russia’s “meddling” in its internal affairs through Moscow’s de facto acknowledgment of Hargeisa’s sovereignty claims. Nevertheless, the UAE already crossed that threshold several years ago without any tangible consequences, even though the rivalling Turkey has a military base in Somalia proper. It is therefore unlikely that the recently close Russian-Turkish ties would suffer from such a move either.
Just to play it safe, however, Russia might not opt for building a brand-new military base in Somaliland but for exploring the possibility of reaching a logistics pact with its port of Berbera instead. Although that would also imply some acceptance of Hargeisa’s sovereignty, it would avoid the appearance of any military commitments to the breakaway region and could be justified on the basis of pragmatism. If compelled to choose, it would arguably be better for Russia to take its chances with Somaliland in pursuit of improving connectivity with Ethiopia rather than avoid offending Somalia proper and lose out on this promising connectivity opportunity.
Altogether, Russia should begin considering possible alternatives to its troubled Sudanese naval base plans. Although the Somaliland proposal carries with it risks to Russia’s soft power and bilateral ties with Somalia proper, these possible costs might be worth it if they result in expanding ties with both the UAE and Ethiopia, which are much more attractive long-term partners for Moscow. There would be nothing special about opening a base in a crowded Djibouti if Russia were even allowed to do so, nor does Eritrea provide a viable connectivity potential with Ethiopia, hence the reason why Somaliland should be seriously looked at instead.
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Andrew Korybko is a political analyst, journalist and regular contributor to several online journals, as well as a member of the expert council for the Institute of Strategic Studies and Predictions at the People’s Friendship University of Russia. He has published various works in the field of Hybrid Wars, including “Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change” and “The Law of Hybrid War: Eastern Hemisphere”.
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A Direct Energy Weapon or DEW is weaponry that uses highly focused energy, such as lasers, microwaves, or particle beams, to demolish, harm, impede or decapitate its target. DEW is a long-ranged weapon that damages its targets with highly focused energy. Lasers, microwaves, particle beams, and other similar weapons are a few contemporary examples of the same.
Historically speaking, Archimedes is said to have used mirrors to direct sunlight to destroy warships during the Roman Empire’s campaign against his hometown of Syracuse, according to tradition. Since then, many historians have questioned the reality of such a claim.
In World War II, the German Army created weapons such as the sonic cannon, which caused lethal vibrations in the human body, causing nausea, vertigo, and other symptoms. Experiments employing X-rays as a base were also carried out to pre-ionize ignition in aircraft engines and, therefore, serve as anti-aircraft weapons. The CIA alleged that the Soviet Army employed laser-based weaponry against the Chinese during numerous Sino-Soviet conflicts throughout the Cold War.
Several governments in the Asia-Pacific area are caught up in the worldwide race to build hypersonic and directed-energy weapons, with several big powers developing or publicly announcing their ambitions. DEWs are new cutting-edge military technologies that have yet to be officially deployed by any military power but are expected to be important in future combat.
China and Russia have created unparalleled arsenals of precision-guided missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to overwhelm India’s military defences, much like Russia is doing in Ukraine right now. Because of the magnitude of these threats, conventional kinetic systems such as Patriot missile batteries will be unable to protect US personnel in harm’s way. With the intent to defeat these threats, it will be necessary to combine non-kinetic, directed-energy devices such as high-energy lasers with kinetic defences.
China, predictably, is one of the countries concentrating its efforts in both areas. It is primarily regarded as the market leader in hypersonic weaponry, having previously deployed hypersonic armaments in the shape of the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).
In late 2019, the DF-17 HGV made its first public appearance at a military parade in Beijing, China’s capital. In its first stage, the weapon appears to use a typical ballistic missile booster to accelerate a glide craft, which is then used to strike an objective after re-entry. At a parade, the DF-17s were installed on a five-axle motorized transporter-erector-launcher. As a result, the unit, like much of the People’s Liberation Army’s ballistic missile armament, is road-mobile, making its use feasible and lethal to the strategic points of its opponents.
The development of DEWs is viewed as especially crucial in India’s deteriorating security situation, particularly its ties with China. According to Indian security experts, as technology advances in India’s neighbourhood, the country may become exposed. They also suggest that India look into the prospect of building combat capabilities in this area. Given the escalating security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, many major nations, including India, are expected to step up their efforts to acquire these weapons.
The recent military conflict in eastern Ladakh reminds us of China’s threats to India. Beijing’s expanding military might, including capabilities in space, cyber, and electronic warfare, can significantly threaten its opponents, including India. DEW technologies are also being developed in China. As a result, India is indeed undoubtedly building its own DEWs. “DEWs are tremendously crucial today,” Dr G. Satheesh Reddy, the head of the DRDO, remarked during the 12th Air Chief Marshal L.M. Katre memorial lecture in August 2021. “The rest of the globe is pursuing them. We’re conducting many experiments in the country as well.” he further concluded by briefly showing light on India’s emphasis on the DEWs. Later in December 2021, India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) also announced intentions to build directed energy weapons (DEWs) based on high-energy lasers and microwaves.
Further solidifying these claims, the Ministry of Defence launched its second edition of India’s “Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap” in 2018, showcasing 200 technologies and concepts slated for introduction into the armed services in the mid-2020s. A “Tactical High Energy Laser System” for the Army and Air Force was among the ventures that business was encouraged to adopt.
The ministry envisaged a laser weapon system mounted on high-mobility vehicles that could “cause physical damage/destruction to [electronic warfare] systems, communications networks, quasi communication systems/radars and their antennae.” The armament should ultimately have a baseline range of 20 kilometres, target-locking technology, and the potential to operate as anti-satellite weaponry from both ground and air stations.
In line with the same, India has established a linear electron accelerator system dubbed KALI, or the “kilo ampere linear injector,” for neutralizing long-range missiles. KALI is presumed to quickly dissipate impactful pulses of Relativistic Electron Beams (REB) that can destroy communications components on-board once a missile launch is spotted. Together the DRDO and the BARC worked to create KALI (BARC). Dr R. Chidambaram, the then-Director of BARC, recommended it in 1985. According to reports, construction on the project began in 1989. A high power pulse particle throttle KALI-5000 has been operational with an energy of 650 keV and an electron beam power of 40 GW, the BARC head declared at a BARC Foundation Day address in 2004.
Furthermore, tactically speaking of what is more available as disclosed and non-confidential knowledge in public portals, as per the Congressional report, in a component of its Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle project, India grows an indigenous, dual-capable (conventional and nuclear) hypersonic missile system. It has experimentally validated a Mach 6 scramjet in June 2019 and September 2020. “India has about 12 hypersonic wind tunnels that can test speeds up to Mach 13,” says the report.
Later in 2021, India finally joined the elite nations that have successfully tested the High-Speed Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) using an indigenously produced propulsion system. The successful test represented an essential step forward in establishing hypersonic delivery systems, including constructing a carrier vehicle for cruise missiles and the low-cost launch of satellite systems.
The DRDO is also thought to be making progress on a hypersonic anti-ship missile identified as the BrahMos-II. According to a research, hypersonic scramjet technology is projected to achieve speeds twice as fast as the BrahMos-1, thus exceeding Mach 6.
India undertook two significant missile launches in the latter months of 2021. The Shaurya hypersonic armament launch, which took place in October, was the first. The Agni-P missile test, which took place on Christmas Night, was the second. Both missile tests show that India is on track to develop a more advanced nuclear arsenal with a broader range of propulsion systems. These achievements have sparked a flurry of reactions, ranging from delight at the improved preparedness of India’s arsenal to dire predictions about what these missile developments could mean for geopolitical stability, mainly between India, China and Pakistan.
India’s missile arsenal is improving to dissuade and deter the Army of the People’s Republic of China. India’s competencies at the time are much inferior to those of the latter. Beijing has deployed its Dong-Feng (DF)-26 IRBMs in Western China’s Xinjiang province. China’s DF-17 HGV, with an operative ballpark range of 1,800-2,500km, is a significant threat. Beijing is reported to have been operating this since at least 2019, which is also a retaliation to India’s Shaurya hypersonic armament. Due to its limited geography, Pakistan is especially susceptible to strategic interception compared to China’s geographic and strategic depth. In any case, Beijing’s submarine-based nuclear-weapons provide it with a near-invulnerable second-strike capability, complicating India’s counter-force operations versus the Chinese nuclear targets. As a result, India’s hypersonic arsenal, Agni SRBM, and IRBM warheads maintain strategic deterrence and improve its position in South Asia’s geopolitical equilibrium.
DEWs and hypersonic missile systems, in my perspective, should indeed be considered as one component of a more considerable global military technological evolution. Directed-energy weapons will redefine how objectives are captured and attacked in years to come, much as electronic technology has progressed the speed and accuracy of the flow of information. Once the technological impediments outlined above are resolved, the future of this technology could have near-endless potential when it comes to engaging aerial targets like missiles or drones.
The DRDO’s objective and budgetary allocations primarily aim to establish and subsequently operate DEWs that are limited to terrestrial assignments. As a result, it’s possible that India won’t be able to produce the whole array of DEWs. Despite their current technological limitations, the DRDO and the administration will need to recognize which direct energy weapons are sustainable in the long run.
The Chinese are quickly developing and fielding DEWs for attacking and defending purposes. India will not be able to rely solely on defensive qualities to secure and safeguard its troops and equipment; it will also require aggressive DEW capacities, which may be minor but would require intensive and considerable attention.
Many specialists in the industry believe that directed-energy weapons will unravel new forms of lethal and nonlethal engagements in the long term. This, although, would entirely be determined by what is defined as “appropriate.” Despite decades of research into the practical applications of Direct Energy Weapons, they are still thought to be at the experimental stage, even though a few prototypes have been proclaimed to be functional by certain nations.
While the absence of a functional hypersonic missile defence system makes such capabilities appealing, research shows significant hurdles to overcome, such as the propulsion system and the intense heat generated by these weapon systems. G Satheesh Reddy, the DRDO’s chief, had stated that realising a comprehensive weapons system working for some advantage would take approximately four to five years.
While it is an apparent common understanding that the Indian ballistic system and hypersonic missile armaments are present in numbers of strength, there needs to be a constant upscaling to keep up with the ever-evolving warfare strategies and armament systems.
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Authors: He Jun and Chan Kung
The war between Russia and Ukraine has lasted 35 days since it began on February 24. For a long time, Russia has had the image and influence as a great power, which is mainly reflected in its military strength, and in its 2,000 nuclear weapons, as well as its powerful conventional armed forces and combat effectiveness. However, judging from the actual progress of this war, although the Russian army is still on the proactive side of the war as a whole, its actual combat performance is quite different from what the world imagined it to be. To some extent, the Russian army was even “trapped” by the resistance of the Ukrainian army.
An important revelation brought by this war is that the world now sees clearly what are a country’s actual “strategic resources”.
According to a general understanding, “strategic resources” refer to human resources, natural resources, and artificial resources that play an important role in the overall situation of the war. Among them, human resources refer to the quantity and quality of the population with the necessary labor capacity, including the ability to perform military service. Natural resources include land resources, mineral resources, hydraulic resources, biological resources, and marine resources. Artificial resources are substances developed and processed by human beings, including means of production and consumption.
A country’s strategic resource status depends on its geographic location, land mass, population quality, topography, geological structure, as well as whether these resources can be reasonably developed, transported, stored, distributed, and consumed. Strategic resources are the material basis for preparing for and conducting wars. They determine a country’s potential ability to support wars, directly affect the process and outcome of wars, and are an important basis in formulating national and military strategies. When a country determines its strategic intentions, it must be based on the practical limits that strategic resources can provide. If the strategic attempt exceeds the limit of strategic resources, it will inevitably reduce the ability to continue the war and eventually lead to the defeat.
The above understanding is closer to research definition, which is a systematic description of national strategic resources and their roles. Strategic resources in actual warfare would have simpler answer. Looking at the war in Ukraine, researchers at ANBOUND believe that the “strategic resources” that matter to national security the most are energy, food, military, and industrial sectors that can be “weaponized”.
Undoubtedly, the importance of energy is not only the guarantee for the military’s combat operations but also the basic driving force for the economic and social operation of the country during wartime. In the Russia-Ukraine war, the importance of energy is extremely prominent. It is not only an important means for the United States to sanction Russia, but also a crucial weapon for Russia against European countries. For the world’s major energy-demanding countries, in the event of a war, ensuring basic energy security will be an extremely important issue.
Food is also a critical strategic resource in times of national war. Simply put, food is required during war time, not only to feed the army but also for the common people to survive. Widespread food shortages during war may cause more panic than the army losing a battle. Especially if the war continues, the nation’s ability to reserve and obtain food from various markets becomes as important as the ability to obtain weapons and ammunition.
The army is the protagonist and the most important strategic resource during the war. It involves the quantity, quality, combat effectiveness, morale, and cooperation of different branches of the military, and is also tied to a country’s ability to supply and train soldiers. In the Russia-Ukraine War, the size of the Russian Federation army exceeded 1 million (approximately 1.027 million), while the Ukrainian army was only about 200,000. Although the size of the Russian military is five times that of the Ukrainian military, the actual Russian troops that can be put into the Ukrainian battlefield are not more than 200,000. With the stalemate of the war, the number of troops available to Russia has become insufficient, thus troops from Russia’s Far East were also transferred to Ukraine. Russia later adjusted its war goals to focus on the Donbas, which had something to do with the lack of troops.
The weaponizable industrial sector is also an important key to the country’s strategic resources. It can be seen in the Russia-Ukraine war that energy has become an important weapon in the game between Russia and the West. The energy industry sector has also become a crucial strategic resource affecting the war. The industrial sectors that can be weaponized are not only energy. The semiconductor and electronics industry, various military industries, shipbuilding, aerospace, food production, and some mineral resource sectors can be included in national strategies resources as well.
For a long time, to gain the preferential treatment from national policy, “national security” has become ubiquitous label worldwide, where different sectors are claimed to be related to it. However, as soon as the war begins, the actual “national security” sectors will be revealed. Only the strategic resources that have real strategic value, affect the success or failure of wars and are related to national stability during wartime, such as energy, food, army, and industries that can be “weaponized”, are the real foundations of a country’s security.
It should be emphasized that a country’s shortcomings in strategic resources can become a its weakness in wartime. Even in peacetime, it will also become a flaw that may be exploited by others. In old Europe, in the case of France and Germany, their national policies were strongly constrained by Russia because of their energy dependence. Other countries in the world are affected by food shortage, and inflation has even led to the constraints of financial policies in some countries.
We must be soberly aware that any country’s resources are limited, and it is impossible to invest limited resources in too many areas. Therefore, the focus should be on areas that involve national security. This is the basis of a major national policy. From the perspective of China’s economic situation and resources, energy source and agriculture are the national foundations that will affect its national security in the future. These two strategic resource areas are not without incidents. Due to the high degree of external dependence, there are potential risks.
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Sergey Karaganov has served as a presidential advisor in the Kremlin both under Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. He is still considered close to Russia’s president and foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. His recent proposals on Russian-speaking minorities in the “near abroad” are known as “Putin doctrine” and Professor Karaganov, who is honorary chair of the Moscow think tank the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, was first to come out publicly about an all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2019. President Putin has mentioned on Feb. 24 that Ukraine’s accession to NATO warrants Russia’s military intervention to prevent it. However, Ukraine didn’t even have a Membership Action Plan for NATO and Germany’s chancellor Olaf Scholz clearly stated accession was many, many years off.

How can an attack be justified on such grounds?
«For 25 years people like myself have said that NATO expansion would lead to war. Putin said several times that if it came to Ukraine becoming a member of NATO, there would be no Ukraine anymore. In Bucharest in 2008 there was a plan of quick accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO. It was blocked by the efforts of Germany and France, but since that time Ukraine has been integrated into NATO. It was pumped up by weaponry and its troops were trained by NATO, their army getting stronger and stronger day by day. In addition we saw a very rapid increase of neo-Nazi sentiment especially among the military, the society and the ruling elite. It was clear that Ukraine had become something like Germany around 1936-1937. The war was inevitable, they were a spearhead of NATO. We made the very hard decision to strike first, before the threat becomes deadlier».
But Ukraine was not about to become a member of NATO, not for at least many, many years. There was time to negotiate.
«We have heard all kinds of promises by Western leaders throughout these 30 years. But they lied to us or they forgot about their promises. We were told at the beginning that NATO would not expand».
How can you think a non-nuclear medium-sized country like Ukraine would ever attack a nuclear giant like Russia? And how can you think this is a Nazi country with a Jewish president elected with over 70% of the votes?
«Ukraine was being built by the US and other NATO countries as a spearhead, maybe of aggression or at least of military pressure, to bring NATO’s military machine closer to the heart of Russia. We can see now how well their forces had been preparing for a war. And Nazis were not only about killing jews. Nazism is about supremacy of one nation over another. Nazism is humiliation of other nations. The regime and the society in Ukraine were going very much like Germany in the 1930s».
You say that NATO promised never to enlarge to the East and Russia was cheated on that. But former Warsaw Pact countries requested to be included in NATO themselves. And Russia signed up to the Founding Act on Russia-NATO relations in 1997, accepting NATO enlargement. No cheating there.
«It was the biggest mistake of Russia’s foreign policy in the last 30 years. I fought against it, because the Founding Act of 1997 legitimized further NATO expansion. But we signed it because we were desperately poor and we still were trusting in the wisdom of our partners. President Yeltsin probably thought that we would sneak between drops of rain, to no avail. As for NATO, it was formed as a defensive alliance. But when the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia was weak, I was shocked when I saw the rape of Serbia in 1999. Then we had an absolutely atrocious war in Iraq waged by most of the NATO members and then we had another clear-cut aggression in Libya, always by NATO. So we do not trust words. But we know that article 5 of NATO, stating that an attack on a NATO member is an attack to all, doesn’t work. There is no automatic guarantee that NATO would come to the defense of a member under attack. Please read article 5 of the Treaty. But this enlargement is an enlargement of the aggressive alliance. It’s cancer and we wanted to stop this metastasis. We have to do it by a surgical operation. I regret we were unable to prevent such an outcome».
We all agree the Iraq war was illegitimate and was a very serious mistake. Corriere della Sera came out against that war at the time. But one grave mistake doesn’t justify a second grave mistake. And the US people could elect a new leader, Obama, that was against the Iraq war and changed American policy. Can Russians have an opportunity to do the same?
«I don’t think that in the foreseeable future we will have any change of power in Russia, because we are fighting a war of survival. This is a war with the West and people are regrouping around their leader. This is an authoritarian country and the leadership is always very attentive to the moods of the people. But I don’t see real signs of opposition. Also, in the US or else nobody was really punished for the war in Iraq, so we have our doubts about the effectiveness of democracy».
Your parallels don’t seem to match. In Libya, Ghaddafi was bombing protest demonstrations from the sky. NATO enforced a no-fly zone that had been called for by a UN Security Council resolution and Russia did not veto it.
«Yes. At that time we believed the reassurances of our Western partners. But then we saw a clear-cut aggression devastating the country. That led us toward total distrust of Western countries, and especially of NATO».
As for the intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999, it was made to stop a war that led to over 10,000 deaths and a UN tribunal charged Milosevic for war crimes, deportation and crimes against humanity.
«The massive killings in former Yugoslavia happened after the NATO’s rape of Serbia. People were killed on all sides. It was a civil war. It was an unspeakable aggression. And the Milosevic trial was a sad and humiliating show by petty people trying to rationalize their previous mistakes if not crimes».

It was a UN tribunal, not a EU tribunal.«We don’t acknowledge the right of that tribunal».
You said that the real war now is against Western expansion. What do you mean?
«We saw Western expansion happening, we see Russophobia in the West reaching levels like antisemitism between the world wars. So war was already becoming likely. And we saw deep pisions and structural problems within Western societies, so we believed that anyway a war was more and more likely. So the Kremlin decided to strike first. Also, this military operation will be used to restructure Russian elite and Russian society. It will become a more militant-based and national-based society, pushing out non-patriotic elements from the elite».
The bottom line question is: Mussolini did not recognize the international order that emerged from the Versailles Treaty in 1919. Does the Kremlin recognize the legitimacy of the European order that emerged from the fall of the Berlin Wall? Do you think this order is legitimate?«We should not recognize the order that was built against Russia. We tried to integrate in it but we saw it was a Versailles system number 2. I wrote that we had to destroy it. Not by force, but through constructive destruction, through refusal to participate in it. But after the last demand to stop NATO was again rejected, it was decided to use force».
So the overall goal of this war is to overturn the presence of NATO in central and eastern European countries?
«We see that most of the institutions are, in our view, one-sided and illegitimate. They are threatening Russia and Eastern Europe. We wanted fair peace, but the greed and stupidity of the Americans and the short-sightedness of the Europeans revealed they didn’t want that. We have to correct their mistakes».
Is the EU part of the institutions that Russia feels are illegitimate?
«No, it’s legitimate. But sometimes we dislike EU policies, especially if they become more and more belligerent».

You seem to believe that an escalation of this war to other countries is inevitable. Is that what you are saying?
«Unfortunately it is becoming more and more likely. Americans and their NATO partners continue support of Ukraine by sending arms. If that continues, it is obvious that targets in Europe could or will be hit in order to stop lines of communications. Then the war could escalate. At this juncture it is becoming more and more plausible. I think the Joint chiefs of staff of US armed forces are of the same opinion as I am».
Denazification is what Ukraine seems to have proven by electing a Jewish president. Demilitarization is the opposite of what Mr. Putin has achieved, as this attack led Ukraine to get heavy weaponry from the West. Plus, Germany and the EU are rearming too, NATO has moved troops closer to Russia’s borders, Western sanctions are now much tighter, while Europe and the US got closer together and Russia is becoming financially isolated. Would you say Putin’s military operation is proving a success, so far?
«Nazism is not only about antisemitism. It is about hating and suppressing all other nationalities. And it was taking over Ukraine. We never know how the military operations end. Demilitarization means destruction of Ukrainian military forces – that is happening and will accelerate. Of course, if Ukraine is supported with new weapons, that could prolong the agony. We can only talk about “victory” in quotes, because there are many casualties on both the Russian and the Ukrainian side. The war will be victorious, in one way or another. I assume demilitarization will be achieved and there will be denazification, too. Like we did in Germany and in Chechnya. Ukrainians will become much more peaceful and friendly to us».
But so far the Russian military had to withdraw after keeping Kiev under siege for one month. It doesn’t look like the military operation is going so well, does it?
«It’s a large military operation, so it has secrets in the way it’s waged. What if the Kiev operation was meant to distract Ukrainian forces and keep them away from the main theater in the South and South-East? Maybe that was the plan. Moreover Russian troops have been very careful not to hit civilian targets, we used only 30-35% of the lethal weapons that we could use. If we had used everything, that would have meant the destruction of Ukrainian cities and a much quicker victory. We did not do carpet bombing like Americans in Iraq. The endgame probably will be a new treaty, maybe with Zelensky still there. Probably it would mean the creation of a country in South and South-East Ukraine that is friendly to Russia. Maybe there will be several Ukraines. But at this juncture it is impossible to predict because, of course, it’s an open-ended story. We are in the fog of war».

There is clear evidence that civilians have been targeted and killed by the Russian in Mariupol, in Bucha and elsewhere. These look very much like war crimes and crimes against humanity and they were deliberate. Should they be persecuted?
«The Bucha story is completely fake-staged, it’s a provocation».
It doesn’t look staged at all.
«I watched the pictures and I am 99% sure. But more in general there is a war and civilians suffer. We know that Ukrainian neoNazi forces have been using civilians as living shields, especially in Mariupol. We have different pictures with you».
It’s rather the opposite: the Russian army did not allow humanitarian corridors.
«We opened them. They were blocked by nationalist forces. I know how our military operates but, of course, this is a war. We face a tragedy».
Did you expect this level of cohesion between Europe and the US?
«Well, the cohesion will collapse because of the problems of the West. But for the time being they were organizing even before this conflict. The West is failing and losing its position in the world, so it needs an enemy – for the moment we are the enemy. I don’t think the unity will last, Europe will not commit the suicide by choosing to lose its independence. I hope our European neighbors will recuperate from this dizziness of hatred».
You speak like some other country started this war, in fact Russia started it.
«I was not for this particular scenario, but it happened. And I support my country. The West committed several aggressions. We are now on the same moral level, we are equal, we are doing more or less like you. I regret that we lost our moral superiority. But we are fighting an existential war».
Sanctions are getting tighter. Will Russia become more dependent on China?
«There is no question about that: we will be more integrated and more dependent on China. It has positive elements but overall we will be much more dependent. I am not very much afraid of becoming a pawn of China like some EU states became pawns of the US. First, Russians have a core gene of sovereignty. Second, we are culturally different from the Chinese, I don’t think that China could or would like to overtake us. However we are not happy with the situation, because I would have preferred to have better relations with Europe. But Chinese are our close allies and friends and the biggest source of Russian strength after Russian people themselves. We are a source of their strength. I would prefer to end this confrontation with Europe. My calculation was to create a safe Western flank to compete more effectively In the Asian world of tomorrow».
You declared that China, not Russia, will emerge as the victor in this war. What did you mean?
«We will be victorious because Russians always are in the end. But in the meantime we will lose a lot. We will lose people. We will lose financial resources and we will become poorer for the time being. But we are ready to sacrifice in order to build a more viable and fair international system. We are talking about Ukraine, but we really want to build a different international system than the one that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and, in turn, is now collapsing. We all are sinking into chaos now. We would like to build Fortress Russia to defend ourselves from this chaos, even if we are getting poorer for this. Unfortunately the chaos could take over Europe, if Europe doesn’t act according to its interests. What Europe is doing right now is absolutely suicidal».
Is that a threat? Don’t you think nuclear deterrence still applies?
«I know that officially under certain circumstances the US could use nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe and they allegedly could fight for the defense of Europe against a nuclear superpower. There is a 1% chance this might happen, so we have to be careful. But if a n American president takes such a decision inviting devastating response it would mean he is insane».
This war doesn’t look sustainable, including for Russia. It can’t go on for long. What are the elements to agree at least on a real ceasefire?
«First, Ukraine must be a completely demilitarized neutral country – no heavy arms, for whatever of Ukraine remains. This should be guaranteed by outside powers, including Russia, and no military exercises should take place in the country if one of the guarantors is against it. Ukraine should be a peaceful buffer, hopefully sending back some of the arms systems deployed in recent years».
Ukraine needs security guarantees, it needs to be able to defend itself or it will not be a sovereign country anymore.
«I am sorry but Italy and most European countries cannot defend themselves either».
They belong to NATO…
«They have been saving on security. That is how they got themselves into this awkward position that Europe is not considered to be a serious actor in the world. Switzerland and Austria are neutral, but are safe. So can Ukraine».
Do you realize that after what you just said, the debate in Italy will move towards investing more on defense?
«You are welcome. One of the grave mistakes of the Europeans in the last decades is that they didn’t invest in their security, under their ideal of eternal peace. But I think European nations should be able to defend themselves, because they have real threats coming from the South and the world is becoming a very dangerous place as international relations are collapsing. The question is more against whom Italy would like to arm. Against Russia? Well, that would be insane. But you need a more robust military force. You are living in a very dangerous place in the world. If you depend on America, you are selling out your own security and sovereignty because the Americans have their own interests».
The EU seems to be moving towards cutting dependence from Russian energy – first coal, then oil and finally natural gas. Did you expect that?
«I hope you are not suicidal. Of course that would damage Russia, too, but Europe would undermine its economy and its social situation. I hope it will not happen, because you can calculate your own interests. If you don’t want our coal, we will sell it somewhere else. If you don’t want our oil, after a time and some losses, we will sell it elsewhere. And if you don’t want gas, well, well, we can also eventually redirect it after some suffering. Russians support Putin at 81% now, people are ready for a rough period».
Do you think Italy and Europe could do something to broker a deal?
«Not easy, given the situation. But what they could do is try to stop this Russophobia, akin anti-semitism of the previous centuries, this satanization of Russia that would lead us eventually to a worse confrontation than we have now. Even Russian culture is being erased in Europe by a new cancel culture».
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